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A recent report by LSE academics extolling the benefits of competition between NHS hospitals
claims causality where there is none. Allyson Pollock, Alison Macfarlane and Ian Greener
argue that the authors engage in data dredging and faulty empirical analysis. In so doing, they
sweep aside decades of evidence showing why markets do not work in health services and lend
support to an HSC Bill that is inherently dangerous.
The drip feed of pro-competition studies from Zack Cooper at LSE raises serious questions for the
academic community and the public about what constitutes bad science and what to do about its
politicisation. Recently, on 21 February in the columns of the FT, Cooper and colleague Julian Le
Grand warded off serious scientific criticisms of the studies with an ad hominem attack,
categorising those in favour of competition as empiricists and those whose work is critical of
markets in health care as intuitivists. In so doing they sweep aside decades of careful economic
theory and evidence which shows why markets do not work in health services and distract the
reader from the facts that their work is ungrounded and far from empirical. Their repeated claims
that competition in the NHS saves lives and improves quality and productivity have no scientific
basis.
In July 2011, Cooper and colleagues at the LSE press-released an unpublished paper to coincide
with the prime minister’s announcement on the Future Forum which had been set up in response to
deep public concerns about the Health and Social Care (HSC) Bill. These concerns resulted in the
government suspending the legislative process for two months to under take a ‘listening exercise’
with the public. The FT and The Economist put their paper centre stage in the HSC Bill debate. The
authors were sufficiently persuasive for the prime minister to declare that “competition is one way
we can make things work better for patients. This isn’t ideological theory. A study published by the
London School of Economics found hospitals in areas with more choice had lower death rates.” The
study in question claimed that “using [acute myocardial infarction] AMI mortality as a quality
indicator, … mortality fell more quickly (i.e. quality improved) for patients living in more competitive
markets after the introduction of hospital competition (to the NHS) in January 2006”.
The major improvements in outcome after acute
myocardial infarction can be attributed to
improvements in primary prevention in general
practice and in hospital care, including the
introduction of percutaneous IV angiography. The
government’s own cardiac Tzar, Sir Roger Boyle,
was sufficiently angered by their claims to respond
with withering criticism: “AMI is a medical
emergency: patients can’t choose where to have
their heart attack or where to be treated!” It is
“bizarre to choose a condition where choice by
consumer can have virtually no effect”. Patients
suffering “severe pain in emergencies clouded by
strong analgesia don’t make choices. It’s the
ambulance driver who follows the protocol and
drives to the nearest heart attack centre”.
The intervention that the authors claimed reduced heart attacks and was a proxy for competition
was patient choice. In 2006, patients were given choices of hospitals including private for-profit
providers for some selected treatments. Less than the half patients surveyed in 2008 even
remember being given a choice, and only a tiny proportion made those choices based on data from
the NHS choices website. If patient choice was one of the two key elements of competition, it wasn’t
prevalent and rather than being derived from the authors’ data, it was assumed.
Crucially, even if patient choice had occurred it does not explain why heart attack mortality rates fell.
There is no biological mechanism to explain why having a choice of providers for elective hip and
knee operations surgery (including hospitals which did not treat or admit acute MI patients) could
affect the overall outcomes from acute myocardial infarction where patients do not exercise choice
over where they are treated.
The problem of data dredging is well known; if you repeat an analysis often enough significant
statistical associations will appear. But the authors make the cardinal error of not understanding
their data and of confusing minor statistical associations with causation. Deaths from acute MI are
not a measure of quality of hospital care, rather a measure of access to and quality of cardiology
care. At best, what the paper appears to show is not the effect of choice on heart attacks but that if
an individual has a heart attack in an area close to a hospital and their GP is near the hospital, then
outcomes are better, but such findings are not new.
Cooper’s working paper which the government cited as supporting their reforms was subsequently
published in the Economic Journal. That it got through that journal’s peer-review process is
perhaps indicative of the poor understanding of healthcare and routine data from reviewers of that
journal. Our response to their flawed work was published in a peer-reviewed piece in the Lancet.
They responded with mainly ad hominem attack and we again responded with scientific criticism.
Last week Cooper and colleagues were at it again with another working paper (as yet unpublished
in an academic journal) that was once again miraculously timed to coincide with an important event;
the prime minister’s summit on the NHS Bill. This time the authors claim that length of stay fell more
rapidly in NHS hospitals experiencing greater competition and that the risk of cherry picking by the
private sector made a case for risk adjusted price. Once again, the authors were careless with the
data and the study design.
There are three problems with their analysis of the data: they seem unaware that lengths of stay
differ between the conditions they examine; they ignore the political context in which the data was
generated; and finally, they show little knowledge of the particularities of the conditions they include
and how these will affect the data.
Cooper and his colleagues use the average length of stay for four conditions, elective hip
replacements, knee replacements, hernia repairs and arthroscopies, each of which differs widely in
lengths of stay. Arthroscopy is usually done as an outpatient and may not be recorded on hospital
episode statistics. Hernia repair is usually a day case although the average overall length of stay
varies by type of procedure and with median lengths of stay of one or two days. In contrast, hip and
knee replacements have median lengths of post-operative stay of four or five days again depending
on the procedures and morbidity, with average lengths of stay in 2010-11 ranging from 5.9 to 8.2
days for hip replacements and 5.5 to 5.8 for knees. (See the Information Centre inpatient and
outpatient data)
Thus, if providers have switched to arthroscopies and hernia repairs or to operating on patients who
are well and healthy they will appear to have shortened their pre-operative and post-operative length
of stay to less than a day. So a provider’s length of stay will depend on the mixture of operations and
mixture of patients and how far they travel. The authors appear to have made no attempt to examine
differences in case mix and length of stay. This is a serious error.
Equally, the authors do not look at how clinical coding changed following the introduction of the tariff
in 2006. Gaming, upcoding and diagnostic drift are widely recognised in research on the NHS in the
2000s, with providers seeking to improve and increase their payments through fraudulent billing and
accounting. This will apply especially where hospitals are under severe financial pressures and
have strong motivations and perverse incentives to change the coding procedures. Arthroscopy
procedures, which previously have been coded as an outpatient activity or not at all (i.e. it would not
have been counted as an admission), may now be recorded separately as a day case inpatient
procedure. These changes in coding distort measures of productivity so that providers may appear
to be more efficient as they appear to do more work than they actually do.
Finally, length of stay is also a product of a range of factors related to the conditions in their data;
pre-operative work for hip and knee replacement needs to take account of rurality and patient
fitness for discharge, especially if patients live alone and have other co-morbidities and
complexities. Patients who live close to a hospital may come in as an outpatient, while patients who
live some distance away may require overnight stays. The authors should also have looked at
readmission rates; premature discharge can result in readmission. The authors have not attempted
to examine any of these factors, and neither have they considered the effect of hospital
concentration on their data.
Le Grand and Cooper call themselves ‘empiricists’ and all those that disagree with them
‘intuitivists’. Unlike scientists, however, they have made no ‘real life’ observations themselves from
which they have generated their theories. They do not appear to have the basic understanding of
clinical practice. They have not made predictions, tested their theories with experiments, or adapted
their models to see if they can do anything other than provide one explanation of many that could be
derived from historical data. Moreover, they ignore the factors that underpin the generation of data
and the need to understand how it is constructed and shaped. Data dredging has resulted in
statistical associations but association is not causation. Bad science makes bad policy and bad
policy leads to careless talk. Careless talk will cost lives especially when it is used in support of the
HSC Bill.
Please read our comments policy before posting.
Replies to this article were subsequently provided separately by Julian Le Grand and by Zack
Cooper, Steve Gibbons, Simon Jones and Alistair McGuire. You can read Le Grand here, and
Cooper et al here.  
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